管理层权力、内部控制与过度投资——基于国有上市公司的证据  

Managerial Power,Internal Control Effectiveness and Overinvestment:Data from China's Listed SOEs

作　　者：干胜道[1] 胡明霞[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]四川大学商学院,四川成都610021 [2]西南政法大学内部审计创新研究中心,重庆401120

出　　处：《审计与经济研究》2014年第5期40-47,共8页Journal of Audit & Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(13BJY015);重庆市教委科学技术研究项目(KJ120107)

摘　　要：管理层权力结构是公司内部治理机制的核心要素之一,合理配置管理层权力有利于提高公司内部控制的有效性,进而抑制过度投资。研究发现:(1)内部控制有效性越高,过度投资水平越低;(2)对于国有上市公司而言,内部控制对过度投资的抑制作用受制于管理层权力。在管理层权力集中的情况下,内部控制对过度投资的抑制作用并不显著。The core of internal corporate governance is to properly configure the management power to facilitate a variety of in- stitutions and policies to promote the company＇s operational efficiency. In this paper, we analyze the relationship of internal control effectiveness and overinvestment. Further, we discuss the effect of management power on the internal control effective- ness and overinvestment. We found that：l ）the more effective the internal control is, the lower level ovefinvestment will be; 2） For China＇s listed SOEs, the management power will a weakening negative effect on internal control effectiveness on the level of overinvestment. On the condition that the management power is more centered, the effect of internal control over the overinvestment will not be apparent.

关 键 词：管理层权力 内部控制 过度投资 公司治理 财务风险 剩余控制权 内部人控制 

分 类 号：F239.43[经济管理—会计学]