FPGA上抗侧信道攻击的密码算法实现  

Side-Channel Resistance Implementation for FPGA

作　　者：王松[1] 陈曼[1] 韩炼冰[1] 段俊红[1] 刘鸿博[1] 

机构地区：[1]中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所,四川成都610041

出　　处：《通信技术》2014年第9期1100-1103,共4页Communications Technology

摘　　要：密码算法在运行时可能会受到侧信道攻击,抗侧信道攻击的FPGA密码算法实现是目前研究的一个热点。通过随机数保护关键数据的S盒移位掩码法被认为是一种有效的防御手段。采用该方式实现的密码算法在提高运行安全性的同时,可能会带来硬件资源开销的增加及加解密速度的降低。通过对SM4算法的实现表明,采用合适的实现方式时S盒移位掩码法抗侧信道攻击实现对算法硬件资源开销及加解密速度影响不是太大,具有一定的实用价值。As the cryptographic algorithm is vulnerable to side-channel analysis during its operation,side-channel resistance implementation for FPGA now becomes a hotspot of study. To counter this analysis, masking scheme in randomizing key-dependent data by addition of one or several random value（ s） （ the masks） is usually involved . This method may increase the hardware overhead and reduce the work efficien-cy while improving the security. SM4 implemented on an Altera FPGA by using certain masking scheme with location randomization indicates that the masking scheme does have certain influence on hardware o-verhead and work efficiency, but this is acceptable when area cost is not strictly limited. Experiment indi-cates that this masking scheme is of practical value in implementing crypto algorithm.

关 键 词：侧信道密码分析 实现 

分 类 号：TN791[电子电信—电路与系统]