野生中药材供给与稽查的不完全信息动态博弈分析  

Incomplete Information Dynamic Game Analysis of the Supply and Inspection of Wild Traditional Chinese Medicine

作　　者：韦范[1] 冯烽[2] 缪剑华[1] 

机构地区：[1]广西壮族自治区药用植物园药用植物保护与遗传改良研究中心,广西南宁530023 [2]广西财经学院信息与统计学院,广西南宁530003

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2014年第17期126-133,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：第四次全国中药资源普查(广西)试点普查项目(GXZYZYPC13-11)

摘　　要：针对中药材供给中的信息不对称性,建立了三个中药材供给方与政府稽查部门之间的三个不完全信息动态博弈模型,得到了相应的子博弈精炼贝叶斯均衡解的五个结论.这五个结论合理刻画了中药材供给方与政府稽查部门的博弈行为并揭示了非法采挖野生中药材现象难以杜绝的原因.结果表明,政府对稽查行为的条件激励措施并不能有效杜绝非法采挖野生中药材现象,只有政府对所有的稽查行为实施普遍的强激励机制才可从根本上消除非法采挖野生中药材的现象.To prevent the supply of information asymmetry on Traditional Chinese Medicine, three dynamic game models of incomplete information were established, which was between three Traditional Chinese Medicine supply side and government inspection departments. And got out five conclusions of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. These five reasonable conclusions characterized an game behavior which was between medicines supply side and government inspection departments, and revealed the reasons why its difficult to stop the phenomenon of illegal excavating the wild Traditional Chinese Medicine. The results showed that the conditions tbr government incentives to inspection can not effectively eliminate the phenomenon of illegal excavation of wild Traditional Chinese Medicine. Only the government implement strong incentives to behavior of all the inspector incentives can radically eliminate this phenomenon.

关 键 词：野生中药材稽查 不完全信息动态博弈 子博弈精炼贝叶斯均衡 

分 类 号：S567[农业科学—中草药栽培] D922.16[农业科学—作物学]