信息安全服务外包决策分析模型研究  

Information Security Services Outsourcing Decision Analysis Model

作　　者：丘东[1] 王维才[1] 谢宗晓[2] 王兴起[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京科技大学东凌经济管理学院,北京100083 [2]南开大学商学院,天津300071

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2014年第16期111-116,共6页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

摘　　要：随着信息化的发展,信息安全得到前所未有的重视,国家主管机构的监管越来越严厉,企业在面临强制压力的合规性问题时可以选择自行部署,也可以选择服务外包.通过建立数学模型模拟了这个过程.分析结果表明:在强制压力情况下,如果用户选择外包方式,那么用户信息系统的期望值随着强制压力的提高而降低,信息安全服务供应商的利润则随着强制压力的提高而提高.With the development of information technology, information security has been received unprecedented attention, national regulatory authorities increasingly stringent, en- terprises in the face of pressure to force compliance issues may choose to deploy themselves, or choose outsourcing. In this paper, we establish a mathematical model to simulate this process. The results suggested that： in the case of coercive pressure, if the user selects the outsourcing, the expected value of the user information system increase with the pressure force is reduced, the information security service provider profits increase, along with the pressure forces increased.

关 键 词：信息安全 服务外包 强制压力 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机系统结构]