财政压力、晋升压力、官员任期与地方国企过度投资  

Fiscal Pressure,Promotion Pressure,Tenure of Office and Local State-owned Companies'Overinvestment

作　　者：曹春方[1] 马连福[2] 沈小秀[2] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学会计学院,中国政府审计研究中心 [2]南开大学公司治理研究院

出　　处：《经济学（季刊）》2014年第3期1415-1436,共22页China Economic Quarterly

基　　金：国家自然科学基金青年基金项目(71302181、71302088);教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区项目(13XJC630001)阶段性成果

摘　　要：本文将官员个体动机与地方政府群体动机分开讨论,实证检验财政压力、晋升压力以及官员任期对地方国企过度投资的影响。研究发现:财政压力和晋升压力均能导致地方国企过度投资,并且财政压力部分中介了晋升压力对过度投资的作用;官员任期与地方国企过度投资之间存在倒U形关系,而晋升压力导致的过度投资也随任期倒U形变化。进一步发现,这些影响因官员来源及控制人政治级别而异;官员任期以及任期调节下的晋升压力对地方国企过度投资的"掠夺之手",部分是通过影响企业长期贷款的"支持之手"来实现的。本文从官员个体和地方政府群体动机角度探讨了过度投资的原因和具体途径,拓展和丰富了政府"掠夺之手"的研究。This paper tests the impacts of fiscal incentives,promotion incentives and ten ure of office on the overinvestment behaviors in local state owned companies. The results show that both fiscal pressure and promotion pressure can lead to overinvestment in local state owned companies,and fiscal pressure partially mediates the effects of promotion pressure on overinvestment; the relation between tenure of office and overinvestment of local state owned companies appears an invert ＂U＂ shape;the adjustment of official tenure on the effect of promotion pressure on overinvestment has a invert ＂U＂ shape trend. Further research found these effects varies from official sources and corporate political level; by influencing the ＂supporting hand＂ of long loan in local state-owned companies,official tenure and the promotion pressure under the tenure adjustment implements their ＂grabbing hand＂ on the overinvest ment. This paper discusses the reasons and the pathway of overinvestment from officials and local government incentives, which extended and enriched the research on government＇s ＂grabbing hand＂.

关 键 词：政府动机 官员任期 过度投资 

分 类 号：F812[经济管理—财政学] D630[政治法律—政治学] F276.1[政治法律—中外政治制度] F275