非对称信息下考虑双方风险态度的外包合同设计  

Design of Outsourcing Contract Considering the Risk Attitude of Both Sides with Asymmetric Information

作　　者：陈克贵[1,2] 黄敏[1,2] 孟凡丽[1,2] 王兴伟[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学信息科学与工程学院,辽宁沈阳110819 [2]东北大学流程工业综合自动化国家重点实验室,辽宁沈阳110819

出　　处：《东北大学学报（自然科学版）》2014年第9期1234-1238,共5页Journal of Northeastern University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家杰出青年科学基金资助项目(71325002;61225012);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071028);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金优先发展领域资助课题(20120042130003);高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20110042110024);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(N110204003;N120104001);江苏省博士后科研基金资助项目(1401130C);江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金资助项目(2014SJD411)

摘　　要：研究了发包方和接包方不同风险偏好组合下,道德风险和逆向选择并存时的发包方对接包方的外包合同设计问题.结合委托代理理论,为发包方设计合同,从而激励接包方积极参与并甄别其私有信息,进而分析非对称信息和风险偏好对双方策略和收益的影响.结果表明,双重信息非对称下双方的策略和收益取决于双方风险偏好组合和信息非对称程度.结果体现双方风险态度对决策的影响和信息的价值,为外包合同设计提供了有力的决策支持.The outsourcing contract design with both moral hazard and adverse selection was investigated under different risk attitude combination between the client and the provider. Based on the principal-agent theory, the contract was designed which was used by the client to motivate the provider＇ s participation and screen its true private information. Furthermore, the impact of the asymmetric information and risk attitude combination on the corresponding optimal strategies and expected profit were analyzed. The analysis results showed that with dual asymmetric information, the optimal strategies and expected profit of both sides were depended on the risk attitude combination as well as the asymmetric information. The above results also implied the impact of the risk attitude on the decisions of both sides as well as the value of information, and provided the decision support for the outsourcing contract design.

关 键 词：外包合同 非对称信息 道德风险 逆向选择 风险偏好 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]