存在强势零售商的竞争渠道内生时机  

Endogenous Timing in Competing Channels with Dominant Retailer

作　　者：刘军[1] 谭德庆[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南石油大学经济管理学院,四川成都610500

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2014年第4期33-40,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271175);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金(12YJC630096);四川省教育厅科技项目(13SB0274);西南石油大学校级科技基金;零售商力量增长背景下的分销渠道内生时机研究(2013RW014)

摘　　要：在存在强势零售商的非对称竞争渠道中,首先在三种博弈时机下分析协商机制、市场竞争以及强势零售商讨价还价能力对均衡结果的影响,然后探讨竞争渠道的内生时机,最后分别从销售成本和卖场流量两个角度对基本模型进行拓展。研究表明:协商机制提高强势零售渠道的市场需求和利润;当市场竞争较为激烈时,制造商将从零售商竞争中获得"渔翁之利",强势零售商过于挤压产品批发价格将遭受利润损失;以往研究中关于零售商同步领导的博弈时机假设是有缺陷的,序贯领导才是竞争渠道的内生时机,并且销售成本差异和卖场流量差异将缩小内生时机的双均衡区域。In the non-asymmetric competing channels with a dominant retailer , this paper analyzes the effects of negotiation mechanism , market competition and bargaining power of dominant retailer on equilibrium results under three game timing , and then explores endogenous timing of competing channels .Finally , the basic model is extended from two angels of sale cost and store traffic .The study shows that the negotiation mechanism improves market demand and profits of dominant retail channel .When the market has more intense competition , the manufacturer will get the benefit of the fisherman from retailer competition , and dominant retailer will suffer from strongly depressing product wholesale price .In the past studies , the game timing hypothesis of simultaneous leadership of retailers has some flaws , and the sequential leadership is endogenous timing of competing channels . Differential sale cost and store traffic will narrow the double-equilibrium region of endogenous timing .

关 键 词：分销渠道 强势零售商 博弈论 协商机制 内生时机 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F273