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机构地区:[1]湖北大学商学院,湖北武汉430062 [2]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072
出 处:《运筹与管理》2014年第4期238-245,共8页Operations Research and Management Science
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71071050;71201050)
摘 要:在JIT环境下,制造商要求长期合作的供应商在其工厂周边租用仓库,而自己只维持较少的线边库存。本文以此为背景,假定制造商投资建设工厂线边库存的费用与其容量大小成正比,分别建立了供应链分散决策和集中决策模型,并提出了制造商工厂线边库存投资建设协调模型。研究结果表明,相比分散决策,供应链集中决策时制造商投资建设的最优工厂线边库存容量更大,从而有利于供应商和整个供应链,而不利于制造商。算例分析证明提出的基于不对称博弈的线边库存投资费用分担策略能够实现整个供应链利益的帕累托优化。This paper investigates a decentralized supply chain under JIT environment, in which the manufacturer requires the supplier to take charge of most component inventory while it holds a small amount of inventory near its production-line by itself. Given a positive relationship between the cost and capacity of product-line inventory, we examine the equilibrium strategies under centralized and decentralized conditions respectively, so as to derive the channel coordination mechanism. The results show that compared to a decentralized system, the optimal production-line capacity is higher in the centralized system. This certainly benefits the supplier and the entire supply'chain but becomes negative to the manufacturer's profit. The numerical example also indicates that under asymmetric Nash bargaining context, the sharing policy of production-line inventory can effectively lead to Pareto optimization from the supply chain's perspective.
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