云资源提供商的合作博弈模型与收益分配研究  

Research on Cooperative Game and Revenue Allocation in Cloud Federation Platform

作　　者：李泉林[1] 段灿[1] 鄂成国[1] 杨碧蕊 

机构地区：[1]燕山大学经济管理学院,河北秦皇岛066004

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2014年第4期274-279,共6页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71271187);河北省自然科学基金(A2012203125);河北省高等学校创新团队领军人才培养计划(LJRC027)

摘　　要：云计算是目前国际上诸如信息科学与管理科学中的热点研究课题,其中云资源提供商是构建云平台的基本单元。目前,对云资源提供商进行合理的收益分配机制设计是提升云平台运营能力的一个关键因素。本文建立了一个由多个云资源提供商组成的合作博弈模型,分析了该合作博弈的超可加性和核心非空性,并给出了云资源提供商及其联盟的收益分配方案:核心和Shapley值。通过一些数值算例说明了云资源提供商合作博弈的非凸性,并表明了如何计算这个合作博弈的核心和Shapley值,为云资源提供商设计了一种合理的收益分配机制。本文的结果为研究IaaS(基础设施即服务)云资源提供商的合作行为提供了新的理论依据。Cloud computing is a hot research topic at present in information sciences and management sciences, where cloud providers are a basic element in cloud federation platform. A mechanism design of suitable revenue allocation among cloud providers is a key factor which can improve operational capability of the cloud federation. In this paper, we set up a cooperative game model for multiple cloud providers, and show that the cooperative game is sup-additive and possess a non-empty core. We study a suitable revenue allocation by means of the core and the Shapley value. We use some numerical examples to indicate that the characteristic function is not con- vex, and to show how to compute the core and the Shapley value. Based on this, we give a revenue allocation mechanism among the multiple cloud providers. The results of this paper provide new highlights for understanding cooperative behavior of multiple cloud providers under the IaaS.

关 键 词：云资源提供商 合作博弈 收益分配 核心 SHAPLEY值 

分 类 号：O225[理学—运筹学与控制论] TP393.0[理学—数学]