政府规制、政府俘获与合作社发展  

Government Regulation,Government Capture and Cooperative Development

作　　者：崔宝玉[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学经济学院,江苏南京210093 [2]合肥工业大学经济学院,安徽合肥230009

出　　处：《南京农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第5期26-33,共8页Journal of Nanjing Agricultural University(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家自然科学青年基金项目(71103056);中国博士后基金面上项目一等资助项目(2014M550285);安徽省自然科学青年基金项目(1308085QG126);安徽大学农村改革与经济社会发展研究院资助项目

摘　　要：在我国现阶段农民专业合作社发展的实践中,政府规制与政府俘获是并行不悖的。不同层级政府出现了规制行为的分化,中央政府和地方政府分别侧重于立法规制与执行规制,地方政府规制的选择性激励赋予了功能型合作社通过构建政治性社会资本和实施政治策略,从而进行政府俘获的制度操作空间,政府规制与政府俘获的夹杂共同造就了合作社的"二元化"发展格局与分化路径,把以小农为主体的合作社排挤出我国的财政扶持体系之中,催生出大量的大农控制型合作社,同时加剧了合作社对政府规制资源的依赖,导致政权软化,削弱政府合法性,陷入了政府权力与合作社发展低效率的"锁定"。In the practice development of farmer specialized cooperatives in China at the present stage,government regulation and capture are compatible. There is a regulation behavior divergence between different levels of government,and the central government and the local governments focus on legislation and enforcement regulations,respectively. The selective incentives of local government regulation provide the functional cooperatives system with an operation space through building the political social capital and implementing the political strategy to realize government capture. The inclusion of government regulation and capture together creates a dualistic development pattern and a differentiation path of cooperative,drives out the cooperatives consisting of small farmers out of the national government financial support system,induces a large number of big farm control type cooperatives,aggravates the cooperative reliance on government regulation resources,and at the same time leads to regime softening,weakens the government legitimacy,and gets into the ' locked' situation of low efficiency government power and development of cooperatives.

关 键 词：合作社 政府规制 政府俘获 行为逻辑 发展效应 

分 类 号：F321.42[经济管理—产业经济] F306.4