外部董事的代理成本与审计需求——来自民营上市公司的经验研究  

The Auditing Demand and Agency Cost of Outside Directors——Evidence from Family Listed Companies in China

作　　者：袁春生[1] 

机构地区：[1]江西师范大学财政金融学院,南昌330022

出　　处：《北京社会科学》2014年第9期85-94,共10页Social Sciences of Beijing

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71262025);国家社会科学基金项目(12BJY015)

摘　　要：以2007-2012年间民营上市公司为样本,考察了外部董事是否会引致较高的代理成本和高质量审计需求,以及经理市场发育对外部董事与代理成本、审计需求关系的影响。研究发现,外部董事比例越高,绝对代理成本越高,但相对代理成本并不高;外部董事比例越高,公司越倾向于选择大规模审计师,支付的绝对审计费用也较高,但相对审计费用并不高;当经理市场较发达时,外部董事引致的代理成本相对较低,公司更倾向于选择大规模审计师,支付的审计费用较低。Using the samples of family listed companies from year 2007 to 2012 in China, this paper tests the demand for high quality auditing and the agency costs of outside directors, and the effect of managerial labor market on the relation between outside directors and high quality auditing demand and agency costs. The results are as following： （ 1 ） the higher the proportion of outside directors, absolute agency cost is higher, but the relative agency cost is not higher; （2） the companies with more outside directors tend to choose big auditors, absolute audit fees are higher, but relative audit fees are not higher; （3） when the managerial labor market development better, agency costs induced by outside directors are lower relatively, firms tend to choose big auditors, and audit fees are lower relatively.

关 键 词：外部董事 代理成本 审计需求 经理市场 

分 类 号：F301.2[经济管理—产业经济]