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机构地区:[1]浙江大学经济学院,杭州310027
出 处:《经济理论与经济管理》2014年第10期38-47,共10页Economic Theory and Business Management
摘 要:市场的竞争促使越来越多发展中国家的企业成为劳工认证供应链的一部分。本文基于买方主导型市场结构,运用信息租模型分析劳工标准在中国移植状况。研究表明,高劳工标准的存在,是供应商追求信息租金和采购商追求真实剩余博弈的均衡;当供应商类型分布不满足单调风险率性质时,会出现低标准混同均衡,也是采购商借助买方市场势力极大化真实剩余的结果;当采购商风险偏好属于规避型时,最后均衡劳工标准较之风险中性时要高,同时买卖双方福利都会提高。Competitive market has prompted more and more enterprises in developing countries to become part of the labor certification of the supply chain. Based on buyers-led market structure, this paper uses the information rent model to analyze labor standards transplant in China. The study shows that, the existence of high labor standard is the equilibrium on pursuit of rents between the sellers and buyers. When the suppliers type of distribution does not meet the monotone hazard rate property, there will be a low standard pooling equilibrium which helps buyers maximize real remaining with buyers' market forces. When the buyers are risk-averse, the final equilibrium labor standard is higher than that is risk-neutral. Meanwhile it will also improve the welfare of buyers and sellers.
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