委托代理视角下的公司税收规避价值效应研究——来自中国资本市场的经验证据  

The Value Effect of Corporate Tax Avoidance Under the Perspective of Proxy Agent from the Empirical Evidence of Chinese Capital Market

作　　者：王静[1] 张天西[1] 郝东洋[2] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052 [2]华东师范大学商学院,上海200241

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2014年第9期52-60,共9页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71372104);教育部哲学社会科学研究资助重点项目(11JHQ006)

摘　　要：本文基于委托代理框架考察了我国资本市场上市公司避税行为的价值效应,并检验了公司综合治理机制对税收规避与公司价值之间关系的影响。研究发现,避税的价值效应在一定程度上取决于公司治理机制,综合治理水平高的公司实施避税能够促进其价值提升,而治理较差的公司则体现为避税活动降低了公司价值。对此,投资者关注了代理问题对避税边际效益的影响,并愿意为治理机制完善的公司所成功实施的避税行为支付溢价。该结论支持税收规避的代理理论假说,也丰富了有关于避税经济后果的证据。This paper investigates the value effect of corporate tax avoidance on Chinese listed companies based on proxy agent framework and examines how corporate governance influences the relations between tax avoidance and firm value. We find that tax avoidance value effect depends on comprehensive corporate governance. Particularly, well-governed companies＇ value can be improved through tax avoidance; in contrast, poorly-governed companies＇ value is adapted to be damaged. Actually, investors pay attention to the influence of agency problem on marginal benefits induced by tax avoidance and prefer to pay well-governed companies price premium due to their more successful tax planning. The conclusions support the agency hypothesis of corporate tax avoidance and enrich the evidences of the tax avoidance economic consequences.

关 键 词：委托代理 税收规避 公司价值 公司综合治理 

分 类 号：F231[经济管理—会计学]