市场竞争、创业型雇员进入与竞争政策的福利评价  

The Welfare Evaluation of Market Competition,Entrepreneurial Employees Entering and Competition Policy

作　　者：吴福象[1,2] 蔡悦[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093 [2]南京大学长三角研究中心,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《经济经纬》2014年第5期87-92,共6页Economic Survey

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71173101);国家社会科学基金重大项目(14ZDA024);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(11JJD790044);教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目(10YJA790198);教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"项目(NCET-10-0484)

摘　　要：基于创业型雇员内源式进入视角,笔者构建了内部市场进入模型,并对雇员前向进入阻止及竞争政策效果进行了福利评价。研究发现,降低市场进入壁垒未必能促进市场竞争甚至会侵害社会福利;当存在创业型雇员前向进入风险时,雇员的能力差异会影响在位企业雇佣决策和福利水平。竞争政策的制定需充分考虑行业技术属性,高技术制造业和研发服务业应强化创业型雇员的诚信和知识产权保护,而提高雇员内源式进入违约成本并加大侵权惩罚力度对创建民族品牌和履行社会诚信义务意义重大。Based on the view of entrepreneurial employees endogenously entering the market and participating in the competition, this paper constructs an internal market entry model which has made welfare evaluation for stopping entrepreneurial employees prior to ente- ring and competition policy effect. The research finds that lower market entry barriers may not be able to promote market competition, even against the social welfare. When there＇s the risk of entrepreneurial employees prior to entering, differences between employees＇ abilities and controllable degrees will not only influence the employment decision of enterprises, but also affect the level of social wel- fare. Therefore competition policy must fully consider industry technical property. It is crucial to strengthen the entrepreneurial employ- ees＇ integrity and to protect intellectual property for those high-tech manufacturing industry and R＆D services. Besides, it also has great significance to create our national brand and fulfill social good faith duty by increasing the default cost of entrepreneurial employ- ees endogenously entering and the tort of punishment.

关 键 词：市场竞争 创业型雇员进入 竞争政策 福利评价 

分 类 号：F752.62[经济管理—国际贸易]