政府规制与企业寻租——基于矿产资源开采企业生产行为的分析  

Regulation and Rent Seeking——Research on Mining Firms' Production Behavior

作　　者：周晨[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,西安710061

出　　处：《软科学》2014年第10期60-64,共5页Soft Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(41101513);国家社会科学基金重大项目(12&ZD072);浙江省自然科学基金青年项目(LQ13G030017)

摘　　要：从规制与寻租的理论联系出发,构建了一个政府规制对矿产资源开采企业的生产行为影响模型,分析实施规制前后矿企的要素投入和生产决策行为,并探讨规制的有效性。结果表明,如果政府准备实行总量控制的矿产资源规制,单个矿企会在规制发生前就改变其生产决策,通过投入更多的劳动与资本扩大生产规模,以获得规制实施后更多的开采配额,从而实现所有时期总利润的最大化。矿企的这种寻租行为既造成了企业的要素投入无效率和规模无效率,又影响了规制的有效性。From the perspective of the relationship between regulation and rent-seeking theory, this paper builds up a model of government regulation affecting the production behavior of mining finns, so as to analyze the miningfinns＇ investment and production decisions during the implementation of the government regulation, and investigate the effectiveness of regulation. The results show that if the government prepares to implement the regulation of total quantity control, finns will change their production decisions before the regulation is implanted. Finns can input more capital or labor and expand production scale to get more quotas, which make them achieve profit maximization in the total period. Not only are the firms＇ scale inefficiency and factor inputs inefficiency caused, but also affect the effectiveness of regulation.

关 键 词：规制 寻租 矿产资源 生产行为 

分 类 号：F062[经济管理—政治经济学]