网络信息质量感知的信号博弈分析  

Analysis of the Signaling Game of Network Information Quality Perception

作　　者：张晋朝[1] 李云云[1] 谢佳琳[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学信息管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《情报理论与实践》2014年第10期72-76,64,共6页Information Studies:Theory & Application

基　　金：中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目"社会化媒体用户信息行为规律研究"的成果之一;项目编号:2013104010204

摘　　要：文章将系统质量作为具有成本代价的传递信息质量水平的信号,运用信号博弈模型和完美贝叶斯均衡方法,分析了不同系统质量条件下的信息提供者和信息用户的行为策略,论证了系统质量作为有效传递信息质量信号的前提条件,及其对用户信息质量感知的影响作用,对信息市场的高效运行有重要的参考意义。This paper describes system quality as a cost-price signal which can transmit the information quality level. The paper uses signaling game model and perfect Bayesian equilibrium method to analyze the behavior strategy of information providers and in- formation users under different conditions of system quality. The paper demonstrates the system quality as a prerequisite of the effec- tive transformation of information quality signal, as well as its impact on user information quality perception, which provides an im- portant reference for the high-efficiency operation of information market.

关 键 词：信息质量 信号分析 博弈 

分 类 号：TP393.01[自动化与计算机技术—计算机应用技术]