互惠合作下金融资本、文化企业及政府行为博弈  

Behavior Game Under the Mutual Benefit and Collaboration of Financial Capital,cultural Enterprises and Government

作　　者：陈芳平[1] 姬新龙[1] 

机构地区：[1]兰州商学院金融学院,甘肃兰州730020

出　　处：《兰州学刊》2014年第9期189-196,共8页

基　　金：国家社科基金"引导民间资本投资文化产业研究"(项目编号:14BGL166)

摘　　要：文化产业成为支柱性产业,需要政策激励和金融资本推动。文章借鉴互惠合作效用函数思想,在弱化假设条件的基础上,从动态视角分析了金融资本、文化企业和政府行为的三方博弈,结果表明:在政府不参与的状态下,仅靠金融资本和文化企业的随机博弈很难达成合作均衡;金融资本和文化企业的有效合作,需要政府根据二者不同成本支出给予差异化的财政和税率优惠。实践中政府还要先行明确给出激励条件,这一行为不仅可以降低信息不对称和道德风险,还可促进参与各方的最终效用达到最优;此时,若金融资本和文化企业一致行动,将构成三方博弈中唯一的最优均衡。As the pillar of our national economy, cultural industry need policy incentives and financial capital to promote. The paper uses the utility function of mutual cooperation and collaboration, in weakening the basis of assumptions, from the dynamic perspective to analyse the tripartite game of fi- nancial capital, cultural enterprises and government behavior. The results shows that it is hard to reach cooperation equilibrium only on the random game between financial capital and cultural enterprises when the government does not participate; The effective cooperation of financial capital and cultural en- terprise need the government to offer differentiated financial and tax privilege according to different costs. And in practice, the government should give clear incentive policies first which can reduce information asymmetry and moral hazard and promote the all parties achieving optimal. If financial capital and cultural enterprises act together, it will be the only optimal equilibrium in the tripartite game.

关 键 词：文化产业 互惠合作 政府行为 动态博弈 

分 类 号：G114[文化科学]