基于博弈论的物流业节能减排政策执行分析  

A Game Analysis of Implementation of Policy of Energy Conservation and Emissions Reduction by Logistics Industry

作　　者：田园[1] 陈新国[1] 李龙[1] 

机构地区：[1]太原理工大学经济管理学院,山西太原030024

出　　处：《物流技术》2014年第9期183-186,共4页Logistics Technology

基　　金：山西省软科学研究项目"山西省节能减排现状分析和推进策略"(2009041036-02);山西省软科学研究项目"山西现有产业园区生态化转型模式及对策研究"(2012041054-02)

摘　　要：通过构建上级政府与下级政府、地方政府和物流企业以及物流企业与物流企业之间的博弈模型,讨论各个参与者之间的博弈关系,探索参与各方在进行节能减排行动时的内在关系,总结促进物流业节能减排工作多样化的政策手段。In this paper, through establishing the model of the game among superior and subordinate government agencies and logistics enterprises, and between two or more logistics enterprises, we discussed the game relationship between them, explored the internal relationship of these actors while implementing the policy of energy conservation and emissions reduction, and at the end, summarized the diversified means to promote the energy consumption and emissions reduction by the logistics industry.

关 键 词：物流业 节能减排 博弈 政策执行 多元选择 

分 类 号：F124.5[经济管理—世界经济]