基于协同救助的海上救助报酬合理分配方法  

Research on the Equitable Apportionment of Marine Salvage Reward Based on Collaborative Rescue at Sea

作　　者：王军[1] 王美蓉[1] 曲然琳 

机构地区：[1]大连海事大学交通运输管理学院,辽宁大连116026

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2014年第9期74-81,共8页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(13BGJ045)

摘　　要：海上救助报酬是为鼓励人们冒险参与海上救援,由受益人给予救助人的补偿和回报,具有射幸性,奉行"无效果、无报酬"的给付原则。本文以救助方成本性和非成本性投入对救助效果的贡献为依据,首先对各方的成本性投入进行补偿;然后从资源要素的关键性和参与人的重要性两个维度对各救助方的贡献进行综合评价,并按贡献度对"剩余"部分进行二次分配,两次分配之和即为各救助方所获得的分配总额。通过运用"重购成本"和Shapley值法分别对资源要素的关键性和参与人的重要性进行客观度量,该方法可同时解决共同救助报酬的外部分配与内部分配问题,不仅避免了目前各国司法实践中按成本投入比例进行分配的不合理性,也更能体现相关国际公约和国内立法有关救助报酬分配的原则。Marine salvage reward aims to encourage volunteers to rescue properties in distress at sea following by ＂no cure no pay principle＂. Based on the equitable apportionment of the rewards,the effective rescue is benefited with sufficient collaboration by all salvors. In practice, the apportionment of rewards is normally calculated on the capital input of the co-salvors, neglecting the contribution of non-capital inputs. In this paper, a solution is present which compensates the capital input of each salvor firstly, then evaluates the contribution of non-capital inputs with two dimensions, which are the importance of the participants and the non-substitutable roles of their resources measured by the algorithm of Shapley value and re-purchase costs separately. This solution can be used for both external and interior apportionment of rewards among salvors and meeting the requests of the relevant international conventions and domestic law of each country thoroughly.

关 键 词：海上救助报酬 无效果 无报酬 合理分配 重购成本 SHAPLEY值 

分 类 号：F550.5[经济管理—产业经济] X951[环境科学与工程—安全科学]