不完全信息下发电企业竞价的贝叶斯博弈模型研究  

Study on the bayesian game model of power generation enterprise's bidding under incomplete information environment

作　　者：杨珊珊[1] 王宇奇[1] 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨理工大学管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150080

出　　处：《科技与管理》2014年第5期71-74,83,共5页Science-Technology and Management

摘　　要：电力工业改革在发电领域引入竞争,目的在于提高电力生产效率,促进电力工业的发展。发电企业竞价是一个不完全信息下的静态博弈问题,在深入分析不完全信息市场环境下发电企业竞价过程的基础上,运用博弈论中的暗标拍卖原理构建发电企业竞价的暗标拍卖贝叶斯博弈模型,并通过求解贝叶斯纳什均衡得出发电企业的最优竞价模型,从而为发电企业建立有效的竞价策略提供决策参考。In the process of power industry reform, the competition has been introduced into power generation market in order to improve the efficiency of electricity production and promote the development of power industry. The power generation enterprise＇ s bidding is a static game process with imcomplete information. Based on analyzing the bidding process of power generation enterprise under incomplete information market environment in depth, this pa- per constructs Bayesian game model for power generation enterprise＇ s bidding by using the sealed-bid auction prin- ciple of game theory, and obtains the optimal bidding model of power generation enterprise by through solving the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This research can provides scientific decision-making reference for power generation enterprise to formulate effective bidding strategy.

关 键 词：发电企业 不完全信息 暗标拍卖 贝叶斯博弈模型 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]