油气资源开采收益分配中矿区居民利益诉求机制研究——基于利益相关者序贯博弈视角  

Research on the Interest Request Mechanism of the Residents of Mining Area in the Interest Distribution of Oil and Gas Resources Exploitation—Based on the Perspective of Sequential Game of the People Who Have the Relevant Interests

作　　者：王育宝[1] 马金梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2014年第5期91-98,127,共8页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家社会科学基金"土地使用权流转背景下矿产资源开采地居民持续受益机制研究"(14BJL108);国家社会科学基金重大项目"完善生态补偿机制研究"(12&ZD072);教育部人文社会科学规划项目"西北地区油气开发中的利益分配与协调机制研究"(10YJA790192)

摘　　要：油气资源开采收益分配涉及中央政府、地方政府、开采企业和矿区居民等多个利益相关者,而有效协调地方政府和矿区居民间利益冲突是实现油气可持续开采的关键。本文从地方政府和矿区居民博弈视角,分析了不完全信息情况下油气开采收益分配博弈中的纳什均衡、序贯均衡以及不稳定动态均衡路径;并基于博弈结论,分析了当中央政府对地方政府的行动进行奖惩时各博弈均衡结果的变化情况;最后,提出了油气开采收益分配中保护矿区居民利益诉求的机制和措施。The income distribution of oil and gas resources exploitation involves many people who have relevant interests like the central government,the local governments,exploiting enterprises and the residents in mining areas. Efficiently coordinating the conflict of interest between the local government and the residents in mining areas is the key to realize the sustainable exploitation of oil and gas. This paper analyzes Nash equilibriums,sequential equilibrium and unstable dynamic equilibrium paths in income distribution game of oil and gas exploitation when the information is imperfect from the game perspective of the local governments and the residents in the mining areas. It analyzes the result changes of game equilibria when the central government rewards and punishes the actions of local governments based on game conclusions. Finally,it raises the mechanism and measures on protecting the interest request of the residents in mining areas in the interest distribution of oil and gas exploitation.

关 键 词：油气资源开采 收益分配机制 序贯均衡 矿区居民 

分 类 号：F426.22[经济管理—产业经济]