大股东两权分离:代理效应抑或风险分散化效应?  

Control-Ownership Divergence:Agency Theory or Portfolio Theory?

作　　者：潘红波[1] 余明桂[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《经济管理》2014年第11期47-57,共11页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"企业集团的保险效应与风险承受:基于非分散化投资的控股股东的视角"(71272229);国家自然科学基金项目"民营化;风险承担与企业绩效研究"(71372126);教育部哲学社会科学研究重大攻关项目"国家经济安全与我国金融审计制度创新研究"(10JZD0019)

摘　　要：为什么大股东要进行两权分离?传统代理观点认为,两权分离有助于大股东的控制权私有收益,其经济后果是加剧大股东利用多元化等方便利益输送的行为;而本文提出的风险分散化观点认为,在大股东资金一定的情况下,两权分离可以降低大股东监督企业高管所需表决权的出资额,帮助大股东监督更多企业,达到分散化投资以降低风险的目的,其经济后果是缓解大股东保守的多元化投资行为。本文分析大股东两权分离是否影响民营企业的多元化水平,以为这两种观点提供实证支持。结果发现,在大股东不能控制公司时,两权分离会显著降低公司的多元化水平,这主要支持两权分离的风险分散化假说。在大股东能够控制公司且当地投资者法律保护水平或银行市场化水平较低时,两权分离会显著提高公司的多元化水平,这支持两权分离代理假说占主导的观点。本文从大股东风险分散化视角对两权分离的相关研究进行创新,同时,本研究可以为客观评价大股东两权分离现象和监管部门规范大股东两权分离行为提供参考。The divergence between cash flow and voting rights （ control-ownership divergence） of large shareholder is prevalent around the world, especially in countries with under-developed institutions. Why is there control-ownership divergence of large shareholder？ On one hand, separating control rights from cash-flow rights allows the large shareholder to control the firms with a small cash flow stake. The agency theory thus suggests that higher control-ownership divergence is associated with lower cost of expropriation, and thus more private benefits of control of the large shareholder. We call it the agency view of control-ownership divergence. On the other hand, separating control rights from cash-flow rights allows a wealth family or individual to be large shareholder of a large number of firms, and thus lets the large shareholder become more diversified investors. Based on the portfolio theory, we argue that higher control-ownership divergence leads to more diversified large shareholder, and thus alleviates the conservative investments of the firms. We call it the portfolio view of control-ownership divergence. In order to test the two effects, we investigate how control-ownership divergence of large shareholder in private firms affects corporate diversification. To maximize the private benefits of control, the agency theory suggests that corporate diversification is positively related to control-ownership divergence. However, the portfolio theory suggests that control-ownership divergence can reduce corporate diversification. Using private firms of China from 2003 to 2011, we find that control-ownership divergence has an insignificant impact on corporate diversification. This result may indicate that the agency view of control-ownership divergence has the same impact on private firms as the portfolio view of control-ownership divergence. Furthermore, this paper divides firms into firms with controlling shareholder and firms without controlling shareholder. Outside the US or UK, there is usually a large shar

关 键 词：两权分离 代理假说 风险分散化 制度环境 多元化 

分 类 号：F253.7[经济管理—国民经济]