基于风险视角的董事会相对权力与产品市场竞争力关系研究  

Relative Power of Board of Directors and Products Competitiveness:Governance Risk Perspective

作　　者：李维安[1,2] 刘振杰[1,2] 顾亮[1,2] 郝臣[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学中国公司治理研究院 [2]南开大学商学院

出　　处：《管理学报》2014年第11期1622-1630,共9页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助重点项目(71132001);长江学者和创新团队发展计划资助项目(IRT0926);国家社会科学基金资助项目(10ZD&035);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地资助重大项目(08JJD630007);教育部人文社会科学青年基金资助项目(10YJC630070)

摘　　要：利用2004-2012年928家深沪上市公司9年8 352个年度样本的大样本面板数据,从董事会治理风险的角度,验证了董事会相对管理层权力对公司产品市场竞争力的影响,检验了股权集中度和控股股东性质对两者关系的调节作用。研究发现,在不考虑股权集中度和控股股东性质的调节作用时,董事会相对权力同产品市场竞争力存在显著正相关关系;在考虑股权集中度和控股股东性质的情况下,股权集中度对董事会相对权力与公司产品市场竞争力之间关系有显著负向调节作用,控股股东性质对董事会相对权力与公司产品市场竞争力之间关系有显著负向调节作用。By using panel data collected from 928 listed companies from 2004 to 2012, the relation- ship between the relative power of board of directors to management and products competitiveness as well as the moderating role of ownership concentration and type of controlling shareholders are investigated in this study from the governance risk perspective. It is concluded that： without considering he moderating role of ownership concentration and type of controlling shareholders, there is positively significant correlation between the relative power of board and products competitiveness; while doing so, the ownership concentration has negatively significant moderating role on the relative power of board and products competitiveness and the type of controlling shareholders have negatively significant moderating role on relative power of board and products competitiveness.

关 键 词：董事会相对权力 治理风险 股权集中度 控股股东性质 产品市场竞争力 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学] G34[文化科学]