军民融合式军需装备保障的博弈分析  

Game Analysis on Army-civilian Integrating Quartermaster Equipment Support

作　　者：韩迎[1] 赵巍[1] 韩馨仪 刘晴[3] 

机构地区：[1]空军勤务学院航空军需系,中国江苏徐州221000 [2]江苏师范大学商学院,中国江苏徐州 221116 [3]空军勤务学院航空军交系,中国江苏徐州 221000

出　　处：《管理科学与研究（中英文版）》2014年第3期98-102,共5页Management Science and Research

摘　　要：运用委托代理理论构建了军民融合式军需装备保障模型，并对模型中委托代理双方在保障过程中的行为进行分析，得到了实现军民融合式军需装备保障的努力激励、收益分享等一系列结论，对指导我军军需装备保障军民融合式发展具有重要的理论与现实意义。The author construct the model of army-civilian integrating quartermaster equipment support applying the theory of principal agency, and analyze the activities in process of supporting of both sides of principal agency in the model, draw a series of conclusions such as endeavor motivation and gain sharing in achieving army-civilian integrating quartermaster equipment support, which has considerable theoretical and realistic significance to instruct the army-civilian integrating development of our quartermaster equipment support.

关 键 词：军民融合 委托代理 军需装备 博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]