创业投资合约控制权和融资结构的研究  

Allocation of Control Rights and Financial Structure in the VC Contracts

作　　者：邢军峰[1] 范从来[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京大学商学院,江苏南京210093

出　　处：《河南大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第6期40-47,共8页Journal of Henan University(Social Sciences）

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"基于自主创新能力增进的产学研合作创新研究"(10zd&020)阶段性成果

摘　　要：创业企业和创业投资的利益诉求并不完全一致,缔约双方有关行动的选择可能产生潜在的利益冲突,因此,控制权配置成为融资合约的一个重要补充。在不完全合约框架下,单边控制、相机控制和联合控制各有自己的适用条件,每种控制权分配都可以通过融资工具的选择来实现,即控制权分配和融资结构紧密相连。融资额较小时,企业发行无投票权的股权,融资额较大时,发行可转换证券或者债券,更大的融资额需要发行有投票权的股票。这就要求拓宽创业企业的融资工具,尽快引进可转换证券。The goal between entrepreneur and venture capital are not entirely consistent. The choice of action may give lead to potential conflicts of interest. Therefore, control rights become an important dimension of financing contracts. In the framework of incomplete contracts, this paper finds that the optimal allocation of control rights are available through the choice of financing instruments to implement, namely, control and financing structures are closely linked. If the amount of financing is small, enterprises issue non-voting equity; if financing amount is large, enterprises issue convertible securities or bonds; if financing amount is larger, enterprises issue the voting shares. We should introduce convertible securities to venture.

关 键 词：创业投资 不完全合约 控制权 融资结构 

分 类 号：F830.59[经济管理—金融学]