海运服务链中的运力定价和空箱调运责任研究  

Capacity Pricing and Empty Container Repositioning Responsibility in a Sea-cargo Service Chain

作　　者：许垒[1] 卜祥智[2] 冯立攀 李春发[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津理工大学管理学院,天津300384 [2]汕头大学商学院,广东汕头515063

出　　处：《运筹与管理》2014年第5期101-108,共8页Operations Research and Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71302005);教育部人文社会科学规划项目(11YJC630006);天津市科技发展战略研究计划(13ZLZFZF03500);广东省哲学社会科学"十二五"规划项目(GD11YGL01);汕头大学学术创新团队项目(ITC10004)

摘　　要：本文研究了单个承运商和两个货运代理在双向港口间提供往返货运服务的航运服务链。由于港口间货运需求的内在不平衡,货运公司在多港口间的空箱调运会产生巨大的空箱调运费用。分别构建了承运商承担和承运商与货运代理共同承担空箱调运的数学模型,通过数学模型和数值算例分析了不同市场条件下的空箱调运责任和运力定价策略。研究发现承运商和货运代理是否采用定价策略来平衡需求取决于双向港口间货运市场的潜在需求差异。同时,承运商与货运代理的空箱调运分摊为非此即彼策略,当空箱调运成本大于某阈值时,承运商独自承担空箱调运责任;反之,货运代理承担空箱调运责任。而且货运代理承担模式增加整个海运链的利润,但进一步加剧空箱的不平衡状况。This paper studies a sea-cargo service chain with one carrier and two forwarders providing transporta-tion service between two bidirectional ports .To sustain the business , firms have to reposition empty container from a surplus port to a shortage port and incur repositioning cost if the realized demands are unbalanced .We build a stackelberg game model in two cases：empty container repositioning responsibility of the carrier and one forwarder , and analyze the optimal capacity pricing policies and empty container repositioning decisions of the carrier and forwarders .Through model analysis and simulation , it is found that whether the carrier and forwarders employ capacity pricing policy to balance the cargo demands depends on the potential demand imbalance between the bidirectional ports .When the repositioning cost is above a threshold , the carrier bears all the repositioning cost.Otherwise, the forwarder solely bears the repositioning cost .And in the latter case, the optimal capacity pricing policy will aggravate the potential imbalance between the two ports , which will increase the value of the whole supply chain .

关 键 词：海运服务链 运力定价 空箱调运责任 成本分摊策略 

分 类 号：U169.6[交通运输工程] F550[经济管理—产业经济]