耕地保护、政府征地与博弈行为研究  

Game Behaviors in Cultivated Land Protection and Government Land Requisition

作　　者：王小斌[1,2] 邵燕斐[1,3] 谭海波[1] 

机构地区：[1]五邑大学经济管理学院,广东江门529020 [2]暨南大学经济学院,广东广州510632 [3]华中科技大学公共管理学院,湖北武汉430074

出　　处：《武汉理工大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第4期518-524,共7页Journal of Wuhan University of Technology:Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：广东省哲学社会科学规划学科共建项目(GD13XZZ05);广东高校优秀青年创新人才培养计划(育苗工程)项目(WYM11117);广东省哲学社会科学规划学科共建项目(GD12XZZ06);教育部人文社会科学规划青年基金项目(13YJC810016)

摘　　要：耕地资源是保障人类生存与发展必需的自然资源之一,其日益成为各国生态治理研究的重要领域。耕地保护不仅具有显性经济效益,还具有隐性生态效益与社会效益,但外部性的存在,使得耕地保护的私人最优决策与社会最优决策常常发生偏离,难以实现土地资源帕累托最优配置。对此,利用应用博弈论分析了中央政府与地方政府、农民在耕地资源保护中的策略选择,并提出了有效保护耕地资源的措施与建议。Cultivated land resource is one of important natural resources to guarantee the needs of hu-man survival and development,it has become an important research field of ecological management in many countries.Cultivated land protection not only has obvious economic benefits,but also has hidden ecological benefits and social benefits.But the existence of externalities makes deviation between pri-vate superior decision and social optimal decision in cultivated land protection,it is difficult to achieve the optimal allocation Pareto of land resources.The paper uses game theory to analyze the choices and strategies between the central government and the local government and peasants in the land resource protection and put forward the measures and suggestions for the effective protection of cultivated land resources.

关 键 词：耕地保护 外部性 博弈论 生态补偿 

分 类 号：F301.21[经济管理—产业经济]