政策执行失灵:地方策略与中央态度  

The Failure of Policy Implementation:Local Governments' Strategies and the Central Government's Attitude

作　　者：万江[1] 

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学经济法学院

出　　处：《北方法学》2014年第6期102-111,共10页Northern Legal Science

基　　金：作者主持的国家社会科学基金青年项目"中央经济政策地方执行的法律制度研究"(项目编号12CFX022)的阶段性成果之一

摘　　要：由于央地利益发生分离,地方政府并未严格执行中央政策,而是根据政策完备度、冲突程度和处罚力度等因素来选择具体的执行策略。尽管政策执行不当会导致规制失败、削弱中央权威,但由于地方政府享有信息优势,并可通过既成事实倒逼中央政府,导致中央的惩处威胁不可置信,地方政府依然可能会悖逆中央意志不严格执行中央政策。Abstract： Due to separation of interests, local governments have failed to implement the central Government＇s policies, but rather to choose specific implementation strategies based on degrees of policy completeness, conflicts among policies and punishment severity of policies. Though improper implementation of policies cannot cause regulation failures or impair the Central Government＇s authority, local governments may benefit from information asymmetry and threaten the Central Government with status quo so that the punishment deterrence from the Central Government may not well function. As a result, local governments may disobey the Central Government＇s will by failing to properly implement the Central Government＇s policies.

关 键 词：中央政府 地方政府 政策执行 政策软约束 

分 类 号：DF3[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学]