产学研协同创新信任关系的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Trust Relationship in Industry- University- Research Collaborative Innovation

作　　者：薛克雷 潘郁[1] 叶斌[1] 姜亚梅[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211816

出　　处：《科技管理研究》2014年第21期11-16,共6页Science and Technology Management Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"供应链成员间的博弈学习与信任关系研究"(71071075);国家自然科学基金项目"基于利益演化和社会信任视角的食品安全监管绩效评估及风险预警研究"(71173103/G0310);国家软科学研究计划重大合作项目"提升南京企业技术创新能力的机理;路径与对策研究--基于"政产学研金介"协同创新的视角"(2013GXS2D024)

摘　　要：针对产学研协同创新中信任行为的动态演变性,应用演化博弈理论构建基于有限理性的产学研协同创新信任关系演化博弈模型,深入研究产学研协同创新信任关系。研究表明,产学研协同创新信任关系包含多重均衡结果;博弈双方相互信任的概率与协同收益正相关,与创新资源投入、投机收益负相关,与吸收因子无关;存在着最佳的协同收益分配比例,使博弈双方相互信任的可能性最大化;政府加强对创新资源的激励机制可以有效提高产学研协同创新的信任水平。The trust behavior in Industry -University -Research collaborative innovation has properties of dynamic evolu-tion.This paper applies the theory of evolutionary game to the study of trust relationship in IUR collaborative innovation and establishes the evolutionary game model for trust relationship based on the limited rationality of game participants.The re-search shows that the trust relationship in IUR collaborative innovation contains multiple equilibrium results.The probability of mutual trust between game participants is correlated positively with the synergistic benefits,and is correlated negatively with the innovation resource inputs and opportunity incomes.However,it has no relation with absorption factor.There is an optimal distribution ratio of synergistic benefits allocation to maximize the probability of each other trust of game partici-pants.Furthermore,the motivation mechanism to innovation resource inputs can promote trust level in IUR collaborative in-novation effectively.

关 键 词：产学研 协同创新 信任关系 演化博弈 激励 

分 类 号：G322[文化科学]