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机构地区:[1]上海财经大学经济学院,上海200437 [2]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院,上海200437
出 处:《中国人口·资源与环境》2014年第11期154-160,共7页China Population,Resources and Environment
基 金:上海财经大学研究生创新项目"我国稀土价格研究--基于动态模型的观点"(编号:CXJJ-2012-398)
摘 要:本文考虑了一个拥有两种不同成本的不可再生资源的资源所有者对高成本资源储量信息公布如何进行决策的问题,即如果现在尚未开采、且开采成本较高的不可再生资源储量发生变化时,资源所有者是否会隐瞒信息。依据传统的Hotelling模型,高成本的资源会在低成本的资源开采完毕之后才会投入使用,而即使是未来才会开采的资源的储量也会影响现有的资源的市场价格;通过隐瞒或是宣布未来资源新的储量信息,资源所有者可以获得或失去现有的收益,但同时失去或得到未来的收益。资源所有者必须通过权衡两者的得失来决定最优的资源储量的新信息的宣布时间。本文的研究表明,在不考虑保密成本的情况下,如果高成本的资源储量变大,资源所有者会把信息隐瞒到最后才宣布;如果储量变小,那么资源所有者会立即宣布。本文还分析了这一结果似乎与现实中实际情况不符的原因,包括:(1)资源所有者可能本身不是长期利益最大化的,这会导致它们做出符合短期利益的行为。(2)保密本身也需要成本,当保密成本够大时,资源所有者就没有动机去保密了。The paper considers a resource owner how to decide when to announce the reserve information of the high-cost resource,who owns two kinds of nonrenewable resource with different cost.Namely,the resource owner decides to hide the information or not if the deposit of high-cost resource changes.According to traditional Hotelling model,the high-cost resource will be extracted after the low-cost resource is exhausted and the deposit of high-cost resource which will be exploited in the futurewill affect the price of the current resource.The owner can get or lose current benefit,at the same time lose or get future benefit by concealing or announcing new information of deposit.There is a tradeoff between them and the owner must decide when is theoptimal time to announce the information.The paper shows that if there is no cost of keeping secret,when the deposit of the high-cost resource becomes larger,the owner will announce the information until the low-cost resource is exhausted.Otherwise they will announce it at once.We give the reasons why the result is not conform the reality:①the resource owner may not long-term profit maximization itself,which causes them to maximize their short-term profit.②Keeping secrets also need cost,especially when the keeping secrets cost large enough,then the resource owners have no incentive to keep secrets.
分 类 号:F062[经济管理—政治经济学]
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