强制内控审计改变了上市公司财务操控程度和手段么？  

Does Mandatory Internal Control Auditing Change Earning Manipulation Measure Selections?

作　　者：许骞[1] 曾建光[2] 王立彦[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京大学光华管理学院,邮政编码100871 [2]西南财经大学会计学院

出　　处：《审计研究》2014年第6期92-99,共8页Auditing Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“企业集团统一审计:审计师选择、审计质量与经济后果”(71172029);四川省教育厅人文社科项目“环境审计支撑体系研究”(14SB0573);西南财经大学引进人才科研启动资助项目:“基于XBRL的内部控制信息披露及其经济后果研究”的资助

摘　　要：被视为"中国萨班斯法案"的《企业内部控制基本规范》及其指引自2012年年报开始实施,内部控制自我评价及审计正式由自愿转为强制。本文以2011至2012年主板上市公司为样本进行检验,研究发现:强制内部控制审计有效减少了应计盈余管理和真实活动盈余管理;相对于非国有企业,国有企业更明显的减少应计盈余管理,而真实活动盈余管理降低的幅度较小。本研究为观察内控政策影响微观企业行为的选择提供了实证证据。The ＂Basic Internal Control Norm＂ and its corresponding guidelines, regarded as China SOX, officially became effective since 2012. All qualified companies must assess and report the design and operating effectiveness of their internal controls together with auditor opinions, which may significantly influence accounting manipulations. Then we select the data before and after the policy execute and find： mandatory internal control construction and auditing reduce the accrual and real earning management; furthermore, compared to the non-state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises reduce more accrual earning management and keep more real earning management. This study supplies empirical proof about the effect of internal control policy to earning manipulation behaviors.

关 键 词：强制内审 财务操控手段应计盈余管理真实盈余管理 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275F239.4