中小企业诚信合作机制的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Trust and Cooperation Mechanism of SMEs

作　　者：林鸿熙[1] 

机构地区：[1]莆田学院商学院,福建莆田351100

出　　处：《重庆大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第6期84-88,共5页Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)

摘　　要：随着中小企业队伍的不断壮大,它们之间的诚信合作对中国经济发展有重要作用。文章运用演化博弈理论的方法,建立了一个中小企业诚信合作机制演化博弈的数理模型,分析了中小企业诚信合作机制演变的动态过程。分析结果发现,该系统的演化方向与双方博弈的支付矩阵相关,也受到系统初始状态的影响;监察部门的监督作用、惩罚额度及造假成本是影响企业诚信合作机制演化的关键因素;找到了企业之间达成诚信合作的条件,这为实现企业双赢提供一定的理论参考。With the development of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises（SMEs）,their mutual cooperation is playing a significant role in promoting China＇s economy.In this paper,we build an evolutionary game theory model of SMEs＇cooperation capturing the evolution of SMEs＇mutual trust dynamic process.It is found that the direction of the system＇s evolution depends not only on the game payoff matrix but also on the initial state of the system.Other key factors influencing the SMEs cooperation are monitoring frequency,punishment intensity and counterfeit cost.The conditions for the enterprises cooperation are found.This research helps us understanding how to guide enterprises to achieve win-win business.

关 键 词：中小企业 诚信合作 演化博弈模型 

分 类 号：F224.132[经济管理—国民经济]