克服逆向选择：公共干预如何恢复市场功能  

Overcoming Adverse Selection: How Public Intervention Can Restore Market Functioning

作　　者：让·梯若尔 董烨然[2] 

机构地区：[1]法国图卢兹经济学院 [2]首都经济贸易大学经济学院

出　　处：《经济社会体制比较》2014年第6期1-20,共20页Comparative Economic & Social Systems

摘　　要：文章首次分析了市场无法运行时如何激活市场,以及政府对激活市场的机制设计与参与约束之间的双向交互影响的问题。研究表明:政府最优的做法是采用回购和资产注入的混合方案,高价购买企业的遗留资产、清除市场中的劣质资产,使企业在市场中保留最优质的遗留资产;为了控制干预的成本,政府可以通过降低(但不是过分地降低)逆向选择的程度来恢复市场;在政府干预下,现存市场的社会福利不会有损失。The paper provides a first analysis of market jump starting and its two -way interaction between mechanism design and participation constraints. The government optimally overpays for the legacy assets and cleans up the market of its weakest assets, through a mixture of buybacks and equity injections, and leaves the firms with the strongest legacy assets to the market. The government reduces adverse selection enough to let the market rebound, but not too much, so as to limit the cost of intervention. The existence of a market imposes no welfare cost.

关 键 词：遗留资产 逆向选择 市场冻结 机制设计 市场反弹 

分 类 号：F08[经济管理—政治经济学]