地区行政垄断与污染红利——基于省级面板数据的实证分析  

Regional Administrative Monopoly and Pollution Bonuses——Evidence from Chinese Provincial Panel Data

作　　者：张乐才[1] 刘尚希[1] 

机构地区：[1]财政部财政科学研究所,北京100142

出　　处：《兰州学刊》2014年第11期126-134,共9页

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(项目编号:70973115);国家软科学研究计划项目(项目编号:2010GXS5D210)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：文章就地区性行政垄断对污染红利的影响进行了分析,得到了以下研究结论。首先,回归结果显示:行政垄断程度的增加会导致污染红利增加。其次,行政垄断还会通过财政收入、收入差距与投资而引致污染红利增加。文章的研究结论表明,为了促进我国经济可持续发展,我们一方面应加强对地方政府行政能力的监督,另一方面应减少地方政府所拥有的经济性权利,以减小地区行政垄断对环境质量所产生的负面影响。This paper analyzes the effects on pollution bonus inflicted by regional administrative monopoly,the conclusions are as follows. Firstly,the regression results shows that increasing levels of administrative monopoly will lead to increasing pollution bonus. Secondly,Increasing levels of administrative monopoly will lead to increasing levels of fiscal revenue,income inequality and investment; increasing levels of fiscal revenue,income inequality and investment will lead to increasing levels of pollution bonus. The empirical evidences shows that in order to make economic development sustainable in our country,we should strengthen supervision on administrative capacity of the local government on one hand,on the other hand,in order to reduces the negative impact on environmental quality inflicted by regional administrative monopoly,we should reduce the economic authority taken by local government.

关 键 词：地区行政垄断 污染红利 财政收入 收入差距 投资 

分 类 号：F08[经济管理—政治经济学]