利润分享的本质及一般模式  

Natures of the Profit Sharing and Its General Paradigm

作　　者：王真[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京工商大学商学院

出　　处：《经济与管理研究》2014年第12期112-118,共7页Research on Economics and Management

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"中国现代服务业发展机制及对策研究"(12YJA790117);北京市教委人文社会科学重点项目"北京零售企业竞争力提升关键问题研究"(SZ201410011004);长城学者培养计划项目"北京零售企业提升竞争力的理论与实践研究"(CIT&TCD20140307)

摘　　要：一般情况下,劳方的工资收入与资方的利润收入会达成一个均衡,在其他条件不变的前提下,任何一方单方面的变动,都会使另一方作出相反的调整,因此这一均衡具有帕累托最优的性质。研究证明,在追求各自利益最大化的前提下,劳资双方收益分配的帕累托最优性质既不会给双方带来公平,也难以使双方产生效率。相反,具有局部激励相融性质的利润分享机制则具有公平与效率兼得的特征,但在全局范围内,现行的利润分享机制仍属于帕累托均衡的范畴。本文的任务是寻找一个机制设计,将局部激励相融扩展至全局激励相融,使其正能量得以充分展现,促使利润分享制成为一类具有普世意义的劳动者权益。Generally, there is the equilibrium between the amount of the wages of labors and the amount of profits owned by the capitalists （investors）in the existing compensational system. If either amount had been increased, the other should be decreased correspondingly,which is a typical circumstance of Pareto optimal. The research has proved that the existing compensational system under Pareto optimal above could be neither equity nor efficiency. On the contrary, the profit sharing system has the nature of the incentive compatibility in the partial scopes, and it still has the nature of Pareto optimal in the overall scope. The basic task of the paper is to extend local incentive compatibility to global incentive compatibility by some mechanism design in order to put the profit sharing theory into practice

关 键 词：帕累托最优 利润分享 纳什均衡激励相容 

分 类 号：F014.392[经济管理—政治经济学]