基于委托代理视角的信任激励模型与实验检验  

Trust Incentive Model and Experimental Verification Based on the View of Principal-Agent Model

作　　者：孙娟[1] 刘明[2] 费方域[3] 

机构地区：[1]上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,上海200052 [2]上海立信会计学院经贸学院,上海201620 [3]上海交通大学上海高级金融学院,上海200052

出　　处：《东华大学学报（自然科学版）》2014年第5期646-650,共5页Journal of Donghua University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(70573069)

摘　　要：信任是内生激励的重要手段之一.通过在委托代理模型中植入信任指数并进行理论分析后发现,雇主的信任程度越高,雇员的工作努力程度越高,其剩余分享比例也越高.沿用行为经济学所定义的信任测度方法,利用信任实验测度雇主的信任指数.通过礼物交换实验发现,雇主的信任指数与雇员努力程度及其剩余分享比例的关系符合模型预测.Trust is one of the most important internal incentive methods. By incorporating trust index into the principal-agent model analysis, it is found that the more the employer trust the employee, the harder the employee works and the more he shares in the overall surplus. According to the behavioral economic trust definition, the trust index of employer is measured in the trust game. Besides, the gift exchange game show that the relationship between trust index of the employer and effort level/surplus share of the employee conforms with the model prediction.

关 键 词：信任激励 委托代理模型 实验检验 

分 类 号：F244.1[经济管理—劳动经济] F246[经济管理—国民经济]