董事会中的官员与银行审慎行为——基于城市商业银行的实证研究  

The Prudential Behaviors of Officials in Boards and Banks—— Empirical Research Based on the City Commercial Banks

作　　者：钱先航[1] 曹廷求[1] 

机构地区：[1]山东大学经济学院,山东济南250100

出　　处：《当代经济科学》2014年第6期49-60,123-124,共12页Modern Economic Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(编号:71302088);国家社科基金重大项目(编号:12&ZD069);中国博士后基金项目(编号:2013M531569);山东大学自主创新基金(编号:2013GN006)的部分研究成果;"泰山学者"专项工程经费资助

摘　　要：基于官员董事这一特殊政治关联的视角,本文将对政府股权与银行行为关系的研究推进到董事会层面。我们以我国2006-2010年的城市商业银行样本考察了官员董事对银行审慎行为的影响,并进一步考察了官员董事特征及独立董事、女性董事的作用。结果表明相比没有官员董事的银行,存在官员董事银行的审慎行为较差,且官员董事的行政级别越高、年龄越大,这种作用也越大;更重要的是银行股权性质事实上并没有对审慎行为产生显著而稳健的影响。同时,独立董事能够显著的弱化官员董事的作用,且在没有官员董事时,女性董事能够增强银行的审慎行为。此外,我们还考察了样本选择偏差和变量定义问题,证实了结论的稳健性。Based on the perspective of special political connection,that is,official director,this paper pushes the study about governmental equity and banks' behavior relation to the level of boards. We exam the effects of official directors on banks' prudential behavior by using the sample of City Commercial Banks from2006 to 2010. We further explore the impact of official directors' characteristics and the roles of independent directors and female directors. The results indicate that the banks that have official director have lower prudential behavior than those that have not and the higher the administrative level of official directors and the older they are,the bigger the effects. And more important is that the equity of banks does not have significant and steady influences on prudential behaviors. Meanwhile,independent directors can significantly weaken the effects of official directors. And female directors can enhance the prudential behaviors of banks in the absence of official directors. Moreover,we also inspect the problem of sample selection bias and variable definition problem and prove that our conclusions are steady.

关 键 词：政治关联 官员董事 城市商业银行 审慎行为 

分 类 号：D922.1[政治法律—宪法学与行政法学] F832.33[政治法律—法学] F224[经济管理—金融学]