为“先验偶然命题”和“后验必然命题”辩护——与陈波先生商榷  

Defense for “a Priori Contingent Proposition” and “a Posteriori Necessary Proposition”: A Discussion with Professor Chen Bo

作　　者：张高荣[1] 

机构地区：[1]合肥工业大学马克思主义学院,安徽合肥230009

出　　处：《湖南科技大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第5期33-39,共7页Journal of Hunan University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：合肥工业大学博士专项资助项目(JZ2014HGBZ0065)

摘　　要：基于可能世界语义学和严格指示词理论,克里普克提出存在"先验偶然命题"和"后验必然命题"的全新见解,引起了广泛关注。我国学者陈波先生近来对克里普克的有关论证进行了系统批判,得出了关于"先验偶然命题"和"后验必然命题"的否定性结论。仔细分析陈先生的论证可以见得,其对克里普克的反驳建立在一些基本前提与诉求的分歧之上,而最根本的分歧在于是否追求本体论与认识论的严格界划。With the basic theories of possible- world semantics and rigid designators,Saul Kripke proposes revolutionary insights of ＂a Priori contingent proposition＂and ＂a Posteriori necessary proposition＂which have drawn much attention. Chen Bo,a distinguished Chinese scholar,puts forward a series of systematic criticisms against Kripke＇s arguments about the two kinds of propositions,and concludes that there are no such propositions. Through a careful analysis of Chen＇s arguments,we can see that his refutation is based on the disagreements on the basic premises and their goals. The most fundamental difference between Chen and Kripke lies in whether or not to pursue for the strict demarcation between ontology and epistemology.

关 键 词：先验偶然命题 后验必然命题 本体论 认识论 

分 类 号：B81-05[哲学宗教—逻辑学]