电子商务平台中的卖家甄别机制  

Seller screening mechanism in E-commerce platforms

作　　者：罗金峰[1] 李明志[1] 李秦[1] 

机构地区：[1]清华大学经济管理学院,北京100084

出　　处：《清华大学学报（自然科学版）》2014年第8期1087-1091,1097,共6页Journal of Tsinghua University(Science and Technology)

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273151)

摘　　要：该文研究了电子商务平台如何通过甄别机制区分不同的卖家,并进一步分析了甄别机制对于平台收费结构和利润的影响。通过构建并求解一个双边架构的甄别模型,并进行比较静态分析,研究表明:接入费的结构与平台甄别能力密切相关,当甄别能力较弱时,平台对低质卖家收费较低甚至提供补贴。而随着甄别能力提升,平台的定价能力增强。在一定范围内,甄别能力对平台利润有正影响。因此,甄别功能的建立和完善,能够增强平台的盈利能力,提升平台价值。This paper studies how E-commerce platforms differentiate different types of sellers via screening mechanisms and how these mechanisms affect the price structure and platform profits.Building a screening model with two-sided features and comparing static analyses show that the entry fee structure is closely related to the platform＇s screening ability.When the screening ability is relatively weak,the platform charges low prices to low-quality sellers and may even subsidize them.Within a certain range,the pricing power and platform profits increase as the screening ability improves.Therefore,the platform profitability and value rely heavily on the screening ability.

关 键 词：电子商务平台 甄别机制 价格结构 信息不对称 双边市场 

分 类 号：F062.9[经济管理—政治经济学]