地方债务管理与融资规范研究  

Research on Local Government Debt Management and Financing Regulations

作　　者：周学东[1] 李文森[1] 刘念 周源[1] 姜子叶[1] 彭恒文[1] 陈冀[1] 唐晓婕 

机构地区：[1]中国人民银行南京分行,江苏南京210004

出　　处：《金融研究》2014年第10期34-49,共16页Journal of Financial Research

摘　　要：本文运用博弈均衡模型分析当前地方政府债务成因,指出预算软约束是地方政府过度举债的原因所在,创新性地提出地方政府债务可持续条件为:预算硬约束、激励相容和信息透明,并以此为标准评价现有地方政府的融资方式,最后提出以市政债来规范和创新地方政府融资方式的改革思路。本文还从发行、审批、监管、偿债、信用评级和信息披露五个环节对中国市政债进行了具体地设计。In this paper, we build a dynamic game equilibrium model for analyzing current local govern- ment debt, point out that soft budget constraint of local government leads to over-indebtedness, and then we propose the requirements of local government debt sustainability, including hard budget constraint, incentive compatibility and information symmetry. Thus, we assess current local government financing methods using the three standards. Based on the international experience of local government debt management, we con- sider that municipal debt is a suitable financing mode for local government in China. At last, we construct a framework for developing municipal bonds from following five respects, the issuance, approval, supervision, solvency, credit rating and information disclosure.

关 键 词：地方债务融资 预算软约束 市政债 

分 类 号：F812.5[经济管理—财政学]