独立董事辞职、政治关系与公司治理缺陷  

Independent Director Resignation,Political Connection and Corporate Governance Defects

作　　者：戴亦一[1,2] 陈冠霖[1,2] 潘健平[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]厦门大学管理学院,361005 [2]厦门大学经济学院,361005

出　　处：《会计研究》2014年第11期16-23,96,共8页Accounting Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71372071;71172051);中央高校科研业务费(XMU:2012221009)项目资助的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：本文以2006-2012年沪深主板上市公司的独立董事辞职事件作为研究对象,选取重大财务报表重述和严重违规行为作为公司治理缺陷的代理变量,考察独立董事的提前辞职行为是否能够传递公司治理缺陷的信号。研究发现:(1)独立董事提前辞职行为的确具有传递公司治理缺陷的信号作用,即相比独立董事未辞职和正常辞职的公司,独立董事提前辞职的公司下年度出现重大财务报表重述和严重违规行为的概率会显著增加;(2)细分样本后发现,政治关系会显著影响这种信号作用,即政治关系强的企业其独立董事的提前辞职行为更可能预示公司存在严重的治理缺陷。本文不仅为监管机构建立独立董事追溯处罚机制提供了理论与实证支持,而且为学术界争议已久的独立董事制度有效性提供了一种新的认知。In this paper,we collect independent director resignation events from 2006 to 2012 whose company listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen as a research sample. We use financial reporting restatement and company violation as two proxy variables. In this way we want to explore whether the quit behavior of independent directors can transfer the bad signal of corporate governance defects or not. This study has found following conclusions:(1) Compared to the company occurring normal independent directors resignation and non- director resignation,company occurring abnormal resignation will significantly increase the probability that company arise financial reporting restatement and serious company violation. This shows that independent directors choose to leave the company before suffering into a crisis in order to avoid the reputation damage;(2) After further subdividing sample,we find that political connection will influence the signal effect. If the company has stronger political connection,the independent director resignation behavior indicates that company has worse governance defects. This paper not only provides a theoretical and empirical support for regulators to set up a independent director retroactive punishment mechanism,but also provides a new cognition for independent director effectiveness which has depute for a long time in academic.

关 键 词：独立董事辞职 政治关系 公司治理缺陷 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F271