货币政策与银行风险承担行为的异质性  

Monetary Policy and the Heterogeneity of Banks' Risk-Taking Behavior

作　　者：刘生福[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安交通大学经济与金融学院,陕西西安710061

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2014年第12期33-46,共14页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家建设高水平大学公派研究生项目(201406280127);国家社科基金资助项目(13CJY020);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71203175)

摘　　要：基于我国62家商业银行2000～2012年间的微观数据,通过动态非平衡面板系统GMM方法分析了我国货币政策风险承担渠道的异质性特征。实证研究发现,系统重要性银行相对一般性银行而言,在风险承担方面同时具有正向截距效应和负向斜率效应;自有资本比率较高和规模较大的银行对宽松货币政策的反应较为审慎;热衷于表外业务的银行在面临宽松货币政策时会表现得更加冒进。构建将金融稳定目标纳入货币政策反应函数的宏观审慎管理框架,促进货币当局与监管当局的沟通协调,对异质性银行实施动态化、差别化的审慎监管,有利于实现金融稳定。This paper analyzed the financial data range from 2000 to 2012 of 62 Chinese commercial banks through unbalanced systemic dynamic panel GMM method, it is found that monetary policy has a significant negative impact on the bank＇s risk-taking behavior,and that the negative correlation is more sensitive to quantity instruments of monetary policy. Furthermore, the impact of monetary policy on bank risk-taking behavior has obvious heterogeneity. The risk-taking behavior of systemically significant banks has the positive intercept effect and negative slope effects; banks with higher capital adequacy ratios and bigger scale performance are more cautious when monetary easing, while banks keening on off balance sheet items tend to be more aggressive. Therefore, to build a macro-prudential regulatory framework which introduces financial stability objectives into monetary policy reaction function, and to achieve the dynamic and discrepant prudential regulation to heterogeneity banks through the coordination of the monetary authorities and the regulatory authorities, are conducive to the long-term stability for financial reform and financial development.

关 键 词：货币政策 金融稳定 银行风险承担 宏观审慎管理 

分 类 号：F832.3[经济管理—金融学]