销售电价隐性补贴及改革的经济影响研究  

Implicit Subsidy of Residents Electricity Tariff and Economic Effects on Reform

作　　者：唐要家[1] 杨健[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学中国政府管制研究院,浙江杭州310018

出　　处：《中国工业经济》2014年第12期5-17,共13页China Industrial Economics

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目"中国城市公用事业政府监管体系创新研究"(批准号12&ZD211);教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目"寡头三级价格歧视竞争效应与反垄断审查机制研究"(批准号14YJA790051);浙江省哲学社会科学重点基地重点项目"节能减排约束下的深化电力体制改革研究"(批准号12JDGZ02Z)

摘　　要：销售电价补贴是电价市场化改革的重要难题,改革方案设计具有较大的社会敏感性。中国现行居民销售电价补贴是通过政府管制下的低电价和扭曲电价结构来实现的,这是一种典型的电价隐性交叉补贴政策,是福利性供电体制的重要体现。本文通过对中国居民销售电价扭曲程度和电价补贴目标群体受益指数的测算发现,作为一种以公平为目标的补贴政策,现行的销售电价隐性交叉补贴政策既无效率又无公平,在牺牲工商业经济增长和付出较高环境代价的同时,电价补贴存在明显的补贴"漏出",普惠制低电价补贴的最大受益者并不是低收入群体。市场化改革要求取消扭曲电价的隐性交叉补贴,改革总体上并不会恶化居民消费支付能力,电力企业的收益将更为合理,并将显著降低电力行业污染物排放,同时与有效的减排政策协同设计则不会增加工业污染物排放。居民电力消费补贴机制改革的方向是分离电价公共政策工具角色,建立效率与公平兼容的针对低收入群体的市场化电力消费补贴机制。Subsidy of sales electricity tariff is the key obstacle and social sensitive problem on power reform. China＇s traditional residents＇ tariff subsidy is implemented by low tariff under government controls and distorting the tariff structure to subsidize the residents. We get the real tariff of residents and the degree of tariff structure by empirical analysis. The target group benefiting index shows that the current universal tariff subsidy mechanism is inefficient and unfair, there is subsides leakage and the sacrifice of economic growth. The cancellation of tariff subsidy can＇t obviously increase residents＇ expenses, and can indirectly increase supply firm＇s profit, promote industrial growth and reducing emissions of pollutants, thus it will improve social welfare greatly. The reform of residents＇ tariff needs effective emission reduction policy and subsidy policy, the reform objective of subsidy mechanism is building target low-income groups subsides to realize efficiency and fairness.

关 键 词：销售电价 隐性补贴 目标群体受益指数 补贴机制改革 

分 类 号：F407.61[经济管理—产业经济]