精英俘获、自保逻辑与民主悖论——农村低保实施异化和指标错位原因透视  

Elite Capture,Self-Protection Logic and the Democracy Paradox:Causes of the Alienation and the Indicators' Displacement of Rural Lowest Life Guarantee

作　　者：邢成举 

机构地区：[1]北京市农村经济研究中心,北京100029

出　　处：《湛江师范学院学报》2014年第5期157-163,共7页Journal of Zhanjiang Normal College

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目(11BSH024)

摘　　要：农村低保评选过程的扭曲和实施目标偏离是普遍现象。其原因是多方面的,如低保评选过程中精英俘获的出现;村民怕得罪人和村干部不出事的自保行事逻辑;多数村民对少数村民的惩罚和社会控制展现出的民主悖论等。扼制精英俘获,引导农村形成良好风气,打破基层治理者自保逻辑,积极干预村民对边缘群体的无意识惩罚,是完善和优化低保政策的方向。There exists the generalized distortion and deviation of the originally designed aim in the process of selecting rural lowest life guarantee. Reasons for this are several, mainly, the emergence of elite capture in the election process of rural lowest life guarantee, villagers afraid of offending others, village cadres wish not have an accident happened and doing not offend villagers which can be seen as their self-- protection logic, and punishment and social control of most of the villagers against minority villagers, which show the paradoxes of democracy. Direction to improve and optimize the policy of selecting rural lowest life guarantee are eliminating the elite capture, guiding right rural culture, breaking the logic of no accident and no offending others in grass--roots governance, and giving active intervention on villagers punishment and social control against individual deviant.

关 键 词：农村低保 精英俘获 自保逻辑 民主悖论 

分 类 号：C912.82[经济管理] C913.7[社会学]