佩迪特、普莱斯与两种自由的同源性  

Pettit,Price and the Co-Originality of Two Concepts of Liberty

作　　者：曹钦[1] 

机构地区：[1]南开大学哲学院

出　　处：《天津师范大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第5期31-34,共4页Journal of Tianjin Normal University(Social Science)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(13&ZD149);国家社会科学基金项目(13BZZ011);天津市社会科学规划项目(TJZZ12-001);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(NKZXB1261);南开大学人文社会科学校内青年项目(NKQ1104);南开大学亚洲研究中心项目(AS1313)

摘　　要：根据佩迪特的诠释,普莱斯反对把自由定义为民主自治,从而拒斥了"积极自由"的观念。然而,仔细阅读普莱斯的原著就会发现,他确实曾用民主自治来定义自由,但他有时也以"消极"的方式来定义自由。这不是由于他的思想中存在矛盾之处,而是因为他把自由看作是一种单一的、从"自我导向"的观念中衍生出的概念。According to Philip Pettit＇ s Interpretation, Richard Price rejects the idea of positive liberty by denying the conceptual link between freedom and democratic self-governance. However, a careful reading will reveal that sometimes Price does define freedom in term of democratic self-governance, though he sometimes also defines it in the negative way. This is not because there is anything contradictory in his thought, but because he sees freedom as a single concept originated from the idea of self-direction.

关 键 词：佩迪特 普莱斯 共和主义 积极自由 

分 类 号：D081[政治法律—政治学]