地方政府竞争、政府股权与城市商业银行绩效  

Local Government Competition,Government Holdings and City Commercial Banks Performance

作　　者：刘阳[1] 洪正[2] 申宇[3] 

机构地区：[1]西南财经大学金融学院 [2]西南财经大学中国金融研究中心 [3]复旦大学金融研究中心

出　　处：《投资研究》2014年第9期40-52,共13页Review of Investment Studies

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学项目(10YJC790177);国家社会科学基金一般项目(13BJY168);教育部人文社科基地重大项目(14JJD790026);西南财经大学"中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金"的资助

摘　　要：本文探讨了不同地方政府竞争程度和约束条件下政府股权对城市商业银行的作用。结果显示整体来看政府股权对城商行收益率有负面影响,对不良率的作用在控制了初始业绩因素后则表现为中性。当考虑地方竞争以后,发现地方政府竞争程度较低时,政府股权对城商行业绩并无显著影响;而随着地方竞争程度加大,政府持股会显著降低城商行的收益率,并且竞争越激烈收益率下滑越严重。本研究表明城商行作为地方政府竞争的工具而不是目标,至少部分地承担了竞争成本。In this paper we discuss the impact of government holdings on city commercial banks＇ performance through a spe- cial angle of government competition. The results shows that when local governments appear much more competitiveness, such as using more public expenditure on city infrastructure, chasing higher capital inflow or spending more on scientific purpose, government holdings will exhibit deeper negative influence on city banks＇ ROA, which can be called grabbing hand. This is because competition for capital and resource needs more investment and cost, which can be expropriated from its＇ owned re- gional banks. To some extend, the city commercial banks bear part of the cost for government competition.

关 键 词：地方政府竞争 政府股权 城市商业银行 绩效 

分 类 号：F812.5[经济管理—财政学] F832.33