IPO:为佣金而配售?——来自基金公司的证据  

Are IPO Allocations for Brokerage Commissions? Evidence from Mutual Corporations

作　　者：彭文平[1] 吴华锋[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学经济与管理学院,广东广州510006

出　　处：《华南师范大学学报（社会科学版）》2014年第6期103-112,163,共10页Journal of South China Normal University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基金行业锦标赛与基金经理激励约束效应研究"(71002087);国家社会科学基金后期资助项目"基金家族利益输送问题研究"(14FJL002);广东省教育厅学科建设项目"开放式基金管理结构与经理激励效应研究"(2013WYXM0013)

摘　　要：基于承销商偏好理论,对2005年以来询价配售制度下基金公司佣金支付与新股获配量之间的关系进行了研究,发现:承销商佣金偏好是影响IPO配售的重要因素,承销商偏好将IPO配售给为它们带来佣金收入的基金公司。主承销商用高抑价的IPO资源交换基金公司的佣金,IPO抑价越高,基金公司输送给主承销商的佣金越多。基金公司能从这种利益输送中获得打新收益,并且这种利益输送行为主要发生在大券商和大基金公司之间。In this paper,based on underwriter's favoritism hypothesis,we examined the relationship between brokerage commissions payment by fund corporations and the IPO allocated to fund corporations since inquiry system between 2005 and 2011.The study found that the underwriter commission favoritism is an important factor affecting the IPO allocations,and the underwriter favors those fund corporations which contribute commission to them.Main underwriting takes advantage of high underpricing IPO resource to exchange commission from fund corporation.More commission is received by underwriters when IPO underpricing is higher.Fund corporation can benefit new revenue from this tunneling,and the tunneling occurs mainly between large security firms and large fund corporations.

关 键 词：IPO配售 承销商 基金公司 利益输送 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学] F832.39