管理层权力、产权性质与股权激励契约设计  

Managerial Power,Nature of Property Right and Contract Design of Equity Incentive

作　　者：吴作凤[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学会计学院,北京100081 [2]临沂大学物流学院,山东临沂276005

出　　处：《财经理论与实践》2014年第6期53-58,共6页The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics

基　　金：山东省自然科学基金面上项目(ZR2011GL005)

摘　　要：以中国上市公司2006-2012年公告的股权激励计划为研究对象,运用主成分分析法合成管理层权力的综合变量,研究管理层权力对股权激励契约设计的影响,结果发现：管理层权力越大,股权激励强度越高,激励契约中设定较长有效期的概率越低;相比非国有公司,国有公司的管理层权力对股权激励契约设计的影响力显著更强。This paper investigates the contracts of equity incentive announced in 2006-2012using data from the Chinese market,synthesizes managerial power variable using the PCA method,and analyzes the influence of managerial power on the contract design.This study shows that：（1）the more powerful managers are,the higher the equity incentive intensity is,the lower the probability of setting long incentive contract performance time is;（2）the managerial power of state-owned companies have stronger influence on the contract design than private companies.

关 键 词：管理层权力 产权性质 股权激励 契约设计 

分 类 号：F234.4[经济管理—会计学]