企业成长、管理者代理与公司资本配置效率  

Corporate Growth,Managerial Agency and Efficiency of Capital Allocation

作　　者：李云鹤[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学金融与统计学院,上海200241

出　　处：《系统管理学报》2014年第6期788-796,共9页Journal of Systems & Management

基　　金：国家社科基金青年项目(13CGL048);上海市社科规划基金青年项目(2012EJB003)

摘　　要：在Myers模型的基础上,将投资不足与过度投资纳入同一框架,建立了企业成长下的代理问题与公司资本配置效率模型。分别在无外部融资约束及外部融资约束下,考察了管理者代理对公司资本配置低效的影响及随企业不断发展的变化,并分析了公司治理机制的治理作用。模型揭示:随着企业不断成长,管理者代理导致的公司资本配置低效现象将发展变化,且受到公司融资约束状况的影响;同时,公司治理各机制对公司资本配置低效的治理效果也随企业成长而发生变化。Based on Myers model, we constructs a model regarding managerial agency and efficiency of dynamic corporate capital allocation under corporate lifecycle, by considering both over-investment and under-investment within one framework. We then analyze the dynamic effect of managerial agency on efficiency of corporate capital allocation, and its changes with corporate development. We further analyze the effect of corporate governance mechanisms. We find that the inefficiency of corporate capital allocation led by managerial agency is dynamic within the corporate lifecycle, and it is influenced by financial constraints. Meanwhile, the corporate governance effect of governance mechanisms is different within corporate lifecycle.

关 键 词：公司资本配置效率 过度投资 投资不足 管理者代理 企业成长 

分 类 号：F830.9[经济管理—金融学]