库恩对波普尔科学划界的批判是否成功?  

Failure of Kuhn's Criticisms of Popper's Theory on the Demarcation of Science

作　　者：刘默[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海工程技术大学社会科学学院,上海201620

出　　处：《自然辩证法通讯》2014年第6期26-31,125,共6页Journal of Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：本文试图论证库恩对波普尔科学划界理论的批评是站不住脚的。首先,波普尔和库恩是在两个不同的研究背景之下理解科学和科学划界问题的,他们所谈的划界问题是不同的。其次,他们对科学的游戏比喻也体现了他们对科学活动理解的不同。最后,文章从四个方面指出,库恩对波普尔科学划界理论的批判是不成功的。This paper attempts to argue that Kuhn's criticisms of Popper's theory on the demarcation of science are untenable. Popper and Kuhn examined science and the demarcation problem in different analytical backgrounds. They were concerned with distinct problems. Their metaphors that science is a game show that their understandings of scientifi c activities are different. The paper argues from four aspects that Kuhn's criticisms are unsuccessful.

关 键 词：科学划界 可证伪性标准 解决疑难的传统 

分 类 号：N02[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]